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Structural Hindrances or Less








High levels of women in politics and paid work, together with the availability of paid
parental leave and public child care, make the gender imbalance in business leadership
in Iceland all the more confounding. This study analyzes business leaders’ attitudes
toward gender and leadership positions after a gender quota law for company boards was
implemented in 2013. We explore support for gender quotas and whether it is related to
how respondents explain women’s underrepresentation in leadership positions. A
questionnaire was sent to 1,349 managers in the 250 largest companies in Iceland. Our
findings indicate that women are more supportive of gender quotas than men. The way
in which the respondents explain the underrepresentation of women as top managers is
strongly related to their support for gender quotas. Those who believe that women are
structurally disadvantaged are more likely to support gender quotas than those who
adhere to individual explanations. Furthermore, male dominance at higher company
levels is related to negative views on gender quotas, whereas this does not apply at lower
levels. The research emphasizes the impact of business leaders on the recruitment of
women to business leadership positions and, at the same time, has implications for policy
interventions.
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A n overwhelming male dominance persists all over the world within theboard and management positions of corporations. Increased political
representation, education, and labor market participation among women
are only weakly correlated with the number of women in leadership
positions in the corporate sector (World Economic Forum 2018). The
proportion of female chief executive officers (CEOs) in Fortune 500
companies (the largest companies in the United States) is very low and
only increased from 0.2% in 1995 to 6.4% in 2017, although progress
has been more rapid in recent years (Zarya 2017).
Iceland is a case in point. Despite high levels of women in politics and
paid work and the availability of paid parental leave and public child care,
the gender imbalance in business leadership is perplexing. This has raised
concerns that women’s talents are being underutilized in decision-making
at the top level in corporations (Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz 2015). The
European Commission (2012) points out that change is necessary in the
corporate world to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and to create a
sustainable future in which both women’s and men’s talents are fully
utilized. A comparable concern is found in the European Parliament’s
report on women in business leadership (Pande and Ford 2011), which
argues that the shortage of women in managerial positions in business is
unacceptable and calls for some form of kick-start, such as gender
quotas. This is a bold demand because there has been skepticism
surrounding the implementation of gender quotas in the business world
(Rafnsdóttir, Einarsdóttir, and Snorrason 2014). Unlike electoral quotas,
which are based on the assumption that legislatures are expected to
reflect and be accountable to the entire voting population, corporate
boards are supposed to be responsible only to shareholders (Chandler
2016).
It is of vital importance how problems are framed and conceptualized.
Bacchi’s (1999, 2009) method of policy analysis, “What’s the Problem
Represented to Be?” (WPR), proposes that problems do not merely exist
“out there” in societies but are produced through their formulations
and conceptual framing. It is a widespread opinion that the low
representation of women in leadership positions is due to issues of supply
rather than demand, indicating that the hindrances lie with individual
women themselves, rather than in structural hindrances and
discrimination (Pande and Ford 2011, 8). Hakim (2011), for example,









































claims that women’s own career aspirations and priorities explain the small
number of women in top leadership. This is contested by others, such as
Pande and Ford (2011), who claim that women’s lack of interest is not
the primary constraint on female leadership. On the contrary, they find
evidence that individuals and groups who are affected adversely by
quotas, such as male incumbents and firm owners, respond strategically
to reduce the impact of gender quotas on leadership outcomes. This is
in line with an Icelandic study showing that 49% of female managers,
compared with 25% of their male counterparts, believe that the business
sector is dominated by men, with insufficient trust in women
(Rafnsdóttir et al. 2015).
Within the existing legal framework, business leaders can have a strong
impact on the selection of top management professionals in corporations
and on the headhunting process for board members; therefore, it is
important to analyze their views on this matter and determine whether
there are any demographic or institutional patterns. In addition, the
structural and individual explanations for the lack of gender diversity in
business leadership point toward different policies, interventions, and
actions on behalf of governments and corporations to resolve the
problem of gender disparity.
Against this background, we address the following questions, with
Iceland as a case example: (1) Are certain groups of corporate leaders
more likely than others to support gender quotas in corporations,
depending on their gender, age, and the type of corporation they belong
to (women in the majority, gender balanced, or men in the majority in
the company’s leadership)? (2) Do corporate leaders tend to explain the
underrepresentation of women as managers by pointing to structural or
individual explanations?
THE ICELANDIC CONTEXT
Gender relations in Iceland are characterized by high political
representation of women and high female labor market participation.
Since 2009, the country has served as a beacon of gender equality in
terms of the global gender gap (World Economic Forum 2018). Political
opportunity is the factor that grants Iceland top placement in the Global
Gender Gap Index (Einarsdóttir and Hjartardóttir 2009; Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2018), although it was not until 2009 that Iceland
reached the Nordic level of female representation in parliament, partly









































as a result of gender quotas within the political parties (Einarsdóttir and
Hjartardóttir 2009). Iceland has the highest female labor market
participation among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries: 86.2% in 2016 compared with the
OECD average of 63.3% (OECD 2017). Women work 35 hours a week
on average, compared with 44 hours for men (Statistics Iceland 2015).
Despite high female labor market participation, Iceland has one of the
highest fertility rates in Europe: 1.8 in 2015, compared with the
European Union average of 1.58 (Eurostat 2017). This has been met
with public child care and nine months of paid parental leave, including
a three-month nontransferable paternity leave (Centre for Gender
Equality 2017; Gı́slason 2007). In this light, the underachievement of
women in top leadership in economic life is a highly topical issue.
The fact that Iceland is far from being a gender equality front-runner in
economic leadership prompted the minister of business to present a bill in
December 2009 that considered the gender ratio on the boards of public
companies. The economic crisis in 2008 called for a rethinking of the
relationship between the state and the market (Chandler 2016). In
Iceland, the crisis opened a window of opportunity for wider support of
gender quotas, which had already been enforced in the public sphere.
This was not least due to the increased representation of women in the
parliament and how (left-of-center) women parliamentarians joined
forces to challenge status quo (Axelsdóttir and Einarsdóttir 2017; Phillips
1995). In 2010, legislation requiring a minimum of 40% representation
for each gender on boards for companies with more than 50 employees
was passed (Public Limited Companies and Private Limited Companies
Act no. 13/2010). Public limited companies, private limited companies,
and cooperative limited companies were granted an adaptive period until
September 2013. Shortly after, the Althing (the national parliament)
passed similar legislation regarding pension funds (Act on Mandatory
Pension Insurance and on the Activities of Pension Funds no. 122/2011;
KPMG and University of Iceland 2013). A few years earlier, a gender
quota for public committees, councils, and boards had been introduced
(Act on Equal Status and Equal Rights of Women and Men no. 10/
2008). Soon after the implementation of the quota, women’s
representation on boards increased, but almost exclusively in the
companies that the laws applied to.
Female representation on company boards covered by the law, especially
the largest companies (250 employees or more), has been steadily
increasing, reaching 39% in 2016. On the other hand, the gender









































composition of company boards not affected by the law has been stable over
time, reaching 26% in 2016. The quota law has changed neither the basic
gender balance of companies boards not covered by the law (less than 50
employees) nor the gender balance of CEOs and board chairs, regardless
of whether the companies are covered by the law (see Table 1). Hence,
female CEOs have lower representation in companies covered by the
quota law (50 employees and more) than in companies not covered by it
(12% against 22%) as of 2016. Female chairs are also fewer in
companies covered by the law than in companies not covered by it (16%
against 24%). Against this backdrop, this research aims to develop
theoretical and practical knowledge about the reasons for the lack of
gender diversity in business leadership.
GENDER QUOTAS, DEBATES, AND TRENDS
While the history of electoral quotas can be traced back to the 1970s
(Dahlerup 2006), the introduction of corporate quotas is a quite recent
phenomenon, with the first quotas enforced in Norway in 2008 and
shortly after that in Iceland. In principle, the same arguments apply to
both types of quotas in terms of pros and cons. However, quotas in
political representation have been considered more justifiable than
corporate and employment quotas, “because government should be tied
to the people in some degree,” according to Bacchi (2006, 33). Similar
arguments have been put forth by Phillips, claiming that gender parity in
elected assemblies “is a major, and necessary, challenge to the social
arrangements which have systematically placed women in a subordinate
position” (1995, 82). Consequently, there has been less pressure for
quotas in companies and corporate boards than in politics. The reason,
according to Teigen, is consideration for the “autonomy of industry and
respect for private self-governance” (2011, 87), which has limited the
interest in and the request for measures.
However, these boundaries between politics and economics are now
being blurred, reflected in an increased willingness to introduce active
measures in corporate life. The dearth of women in leadership positions
in private business has attracted increased attention internationally, and
the issue of gender quotas in the business world is on the agenda in the
leadership debate in European countries and worldwide (Dämmrich
and Blossfeld 2017). In 2015, 10 countries had established quotas for
female representation (ranging from 33% to 50%) on publicly traded









































corporate and/or state-owned enterprise boards of directors, with various
sanctions. Fifteen other countries had introduced nonbinding gender
quotas into their corporate governance codes, enforcing a “comply or
explain” principle. Many other countries are in the process of debating,
developing, and approving legislation for gender quotas on boards
(Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz 2015). While politicians, high-ranking
officials, and gender equality representatives have in general driven the
debate forward, the main voices against gender quotas are those of
corporate managers and owners, as well as representatives of employers’
organizations. For instance, this was the case in Norway (Teigen 2015),
whereas in Iceland, the opposition to gender quotas has been strongest
among right-wing political representatives (Rafnsdóttir, Einarsdóttir, and
Snorrason 2014), especially right-wing female parliamentarians
(Axelsdóttir and Einarsdóttir 2017).
Prior to the implementation of the Icelandic quota law, most Icelanders
saw it as important to increase the gender balance in top management. A
survey conducted in 2011 showed that 85% of women and 71% of men
saw it as important to equalize the proportion of men and women in top
management positions within private companies and public institutions
(Rafnsdóttir, Einarsdóttir, and Snorrason 2014). This support was more
pronounced among managers: 97% of female managers in Icelandic
Table 1. Gender division among CEOs and chairs of boards in companies to
which quota laws apply (50+) and do not apply (1–49).


























































corporations, compared with 74% of their male counterparts, saw it as
important to increase gender equality in this area. However, this did not
translate into support for gender quotas: only 69% of female managers
and 25% of male managers supported gender quotas for boards of
corporations. The oldest (60þ) and the youngest (30–39) age groups
were most in favor of increasing the proportion of women (Rafnsdóttir,
Einarsdóttir, and Snorrason 2014). In a 2017 survey, 64% of women in
Iceland and 36% of men supported the gender quota laws. The youngest
(18–29) and the oldest (60þ) age groups were most supportive of
gender quota laws (54% versus 53%). Those with lower incomes were
more supportive than those with higher incomes, and those who
supported left-wing parties were more supportive than those who
supported right-wing parties (Social Science Research Institute 2017).
The impact of age and cohorts on support for gender equality is
documented in research (Clark 2017). In an international comparative
study, Inglehart and Norris (2003) found that the older the cohorts, the
more traditional their beliefs about gender relations. However, support
for gender equality seems to have reached a “plateau” in affluent
(postindustrial) societies; egalitarian values have stopped increasing in
popularity since the postwar generations (2003, 39–40). Seierstad (2016)
found the same trend in interviews with women board members in
Norway. Although her participants were largely in favor of quotas, the
youngest women expressed reservations and skepticism, a “disinclined
support,” toward gender quotas (2016, 397). As for education, Inglehart
and Norris (2003) found stronger support for gender equality among the
well educated, whereas the 2011 Icelandic survey (Rafnsdóttir,
Einarsdóttir, and Snorrason 2014) did not show a significant correlation
between views toward gender quotas and education, occupation, or
income. This calls for more detailed explorations of the impact of age
and education on gender equality views, which we will discuss in this
article.
The arguments for and against corporate gender quotas are often based
on the same grounds: justice or democracy, and profitability or utility
arguments (Axelsdóttir and Einarsdóttir 2017; Teigen 2011, 2015). The
justice arguments for quotas emphasize that women’s qualifications and
proficiencies are undervalued in the current male-dominated system and
that women have the right to equal representation as men (Einarsdóttir
2007; Teigen 2011). Justice arguments against quotas claim that quotas
violate the principle of equal treatment and give women preference over
men in a form of “reverse discrimination” (Seierstad 2016, 392), creating









































a situation in which women are chosen because of their gender and not
their qualifications (Dahlerup 2006; Rafnsdóttir and Þorvaldsdóttir 2012;
Teigen 2011). Quotas have further been seen as disadvantaging women
who have reached their position without quotas and harming the
reputations of women, who may be seen as secondary board members
(Rafnsdóttir and Þorvaldsdóttir 2012).
The profitability arguments for quotas claim that women have special
qualities that are underutilized in management, imposing a loss on firms
in the long run (Einarsdóttir 2007; Teigen 2011). These alleged female
characteristics are empathy, carefulness, and cooperation, in opposition
to the alleged male characteristics of competitiveness, initiative, and
power (Rafnsdóttir and Þorvaldsdóttir 2012; Teigen 2011). The
profitability arguments against quotas claim that if leadership ability is
correlated with gender, for whatever reason, the paucity of female leaders
may in fact be efficient. Assigning leadership positions to inexperienced
and worse-performing women leaders may worsen allocation (Pande and
Ford 2011) as quotas lead to less competent women replacing more
competent men (Teigen 2015).
A recent Icelandic study reveals that senior managers’ views on gender
quotas vary depending on whether private or public companies are at
stake (Diðriksdóttir 2017). Senior managers generally favor quotas for the
boards of state-owned companies, for local governments, and for public
institutions. On the other hand, managers (especially male managers)
see gender quotas as questionable in private companies, as they are
considered to violate the property rights of shareholders. Furthermore,
the correlation between support for quotas and utility arguments is
stronger than the correlation between support for quotas and justice
arguments. This suggests that interventions such as gender quotas must
be supported by utility arguments to be accepted (Diðriksdóttir 2017).
Recent research indicates a complex combination of policies to enhance
gender balance in top executive management (Axelsdóttir and Halrynjo
2018). Seierstad (2016) calls for a deeper dialogue on gender quotas that
goes beyond the narrow perceptions of justice and utility arguments as
opposites, as they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The women
board members she interviewed expressed complex and often
contradictory views, embracing utility and justice arguments at the same
time. Seierstad concludes that the picture is more nuanced than hitherto
portrayed, implying “a ‘dual entanglement’ of merit and gender within
justice and utility logics in their deployment to support radical strategies
such as quotas” (2016, 400). In line with Seierstad’s call, we add a new









































dimension to the current debate by analyzing whether managers use
individual or structural approaches when describing the lack of gender
balance in business leadership positions. In this way, we develop
theoretical knowledge of the current situation as well as practical
knowledge, as these two frameworks — the individual and the structural —
require different implementation strategies.
INDIVIDUAL AND STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO
GENDERED LEADERSHIP
To deepen the debate about lack of gender diversity in business leadership,
we use individualistic and structural approaches to analyze our data.
However, as Lewis and Simpson (2017) point out, these two approaches
are not always completely separate in the theoretical discussion, even if
they are viewed as opposite approaches. Although most research in the
area emphasizes structural constraints (Lewis and Simpson 2017), the
individualistic framework has been prominent, especially since Hakim
(e.g., 1998, 2000) introduced the preference theory.
Individualistic Framework
The individualistic framework has much in common with postmodern
theorizing of the individualization of Western societies (e.g., Bauman
2001; Kangas and Rostgaard 2007; Lewis and Simpson 2017). “The
process of individualization frees people from structural constraints — a
process which inevitably erodes the explanatory validity of structural
variables” (Kangas and Rostgaard 2007, 241). Thus, applying the theory
to the lack of gender diversity in business leadership, the individualistic
framework sees women as less qualified than men or as less interested in
becoming business leaders. In other words, preferences and decisions
about family formation and labor market participation matter (Fortin
2005; Gash 2008). Hakim (2004, 2011) has received considerable
attention for profoundly criticizing the European trend toward legislating
against gender segregation in the labor market. Based on the preference
theory, she points out that managers and policy makers should not
expect the same job outcomes from women and men because they have
different career aspirations, priorities, and life goals. She states that
women’s lifestyle choices explain continuing occupational segregation
and that women do not seek careers to the same extent as men.









































The preference model is based on Becker’s rational choice theory,
proposing that gender segregation is primarily the result of people’
choices according to their human capital levels and lifestyles (Becker
[1981] 1991).
Although Hakim’s and Becker’s approaches have been influential, they
have also been criticized for ignoring the social construction of preferences
and choices and for overlooking the heterogeneity of women and men
(Browne 2006; Pascall 2012). By analyzing Irish women’s commitment
in labor market, Collins and Wickham (2004) conclude that Hakim’s
stress on the importance of women’s preferences and aspirations makes a
point but needs to be investigated, rather than deducted from social
policies and official ideologies. This free choice theorizing resonates
with postfeminist approaches in which women are considered to have
full responsibility for their own career and well-being, juggling complex
roles based on a cost-benefit calculus. Gender inequality is converted
from a structural problem into an individual affair, where everything
depends on the individual’s capacity to exercise his or her own
autonomous choices (Budgeon 2015; Rottenberg 2014).
Structural Framework
Within the structural framework, women as individuals are viewed as
equally qualified for and interested in business leadership as men.
Nevertheless, institutional and societal processes determine the
embodiment of women’s labor force participation, rather than
preferences or personal choices (e.g., Crompton and Lyonette 2005;
James 2007; Rafnsdóttir and Heijstra 2013). It is assumed that invisible
barriers exist that work against gender balance at the management level
(Teigen 2011). From this perspective, the quota law can be seen as a
direct regulatory push to penetrate the glass ceiling and other invisible
barriers. Joan Acker (1990, 2006) introduced the terms “gendered
institutions” and “inequality regimes” to highlight the fact that
bureaucratic organizations are not as gender-neutral as is often assumed.
She refers to “systematic disparities between participants in power and
control over goals, resources, and outcomes; workplace decisions such as
how to organize work; opportunities for promotion and interesting work;
security in employment and benefits; pay and other monetary rewards;
respect; and pleasures in work and work relations” (Acker 2006, 443).
The hiring process may, for instance, be imbued with gender, as









































competence involves judgment and can be affected by the gender of both
the applicant and the decision makers (Acker 2006, 450). Inequality
regimes have proven to be relatively persistent, according to Acker (2012).
Menéndez, Fagan, and Ansón refer to gendered institutions as a wide
range of organizational structures such as “job design, career ladders,
work practices, recruitment and selection methods” (2012, 4). They see
the cultures of organizations as shaped by assumptions and expectations
about gender-appropriate roles. They claim that organizational processes
are “gendered rather than gender-neutral,” characterized by structural
rather than individual causes of gender disparities in business leadership.
Blair-Loy (2003) and Weyer (2007) argue that women are not viewed as
suitable candidates for leadership positions because of gendered working
conditions. In a study in 26 European countries, Dämmrich and
Blossfeld (2017) found that women’s chances of gaining a supervisory
position varied depending on gender composition in the occupations.
Women were disadvantaged compared with men in almost all
participating countries in female-dominated occupations (. 69%
women) and gender-mixed occupations (31% to 69% each gender). On
the other hand, the results varied among countries for women in male-
dominated occupations (. 69% men) depending on structural
conditions and national context.
Building on this, we use survey data to analyze (1) whether certain
groups of leaders are more likely than others to support gender quotas,
depending on their gender, age, education, and type of organization
(women in the majority, gender balance, or men in the majority in the
company’s leadership) and (2) whether the leaders tend to explain the
underrepresentation of women as managers differently (by appealing to
structural or individual explanations).
HYPOTHESES AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
We draw on these theories and ask what explains the gender disparity
among business leaders. We seek to understand what factors explain
differences in support for gender quotas among managers in corporations
in Iceland. In line with our previous discussion, we hypothesize the
following:
H1: Women are more likely than men to support gender quotas.
H2: Support for gender quotas increases with education.
H3: Support for gender quotas increases with age.









































H4: Individuals working in male-dominated corporations (in terms of the
gender balance among board members, managers, middle managers, and
total employees) are less likely to support gender quotas than people
working in corporations with more gender-equal distribution.
H5: Those who appeal to individual explanations to explain women’s
underrepresentation among managers are less likely to support gender
quotas than those who refer to structural explanations. Conversely, we
expect that individuals who explain women’s underrepresentation among
managers as structural (i.e., as a result of discrimination against women in
the job market) are more likely to support gender quotas (see Meier 2008).
Our fifth hypothesis is presented in Figure 1. We expect the foregoing
characteristics (gender, age, education, and type of workplace) will
correlate with support for gender quotas partly because they are related to




An electronic questionnaire was sent in November 2014 to management
professionals (i.e., all those who report directly to the chair or CEO of a
company) in the 250 largest companies in Iceland according to income.
The companies were selected from a list of the 300 largest companies in
Iceland presented in the business magazine Free Commerce (Frjáls
Verslun). The magazine classifies companies by turnover. A total of
1,349 individuals received the questionnaire by email, with a 73%
response rate. The questionnaire consisted of 59 questions; participants
were not required to answer all questions, and thus not all participants
completed the survey. Most instances of item nonresponse were
questions at the end of the survey, including questions about the
participant’s characteristics and background (such as gender, age, and
education). Therefore, we see item nonresponse as a sign of a
hurriedness rather than the managers deliberately skipping the last
questions. A survey including 59 questions may be too long for busy
managers, and in fact some participants noted that the length was a
problem in messages to us. The final sample in the analyses is between
489 and 504, with about 27% female respondents (see Rafnsdóttir et al.
2015 for more detailed information).










































To increase the reliability of our dependent variable, support for gender
quotas, we averaged the score of 10 survey items asking about views on
gender quotas in different situations. All survey questions are shown in
Table 3. The answers ranged from 1 (disagree completely) to 5 (agree
completely). Some of the survey items were negatively worded, so we
reversed those items so that all 10 survey items would reflect support for
gender quotas. Cronbach’s alpha, which was used to assess the reliability
of the combined measure, was equal to 0.92, indicating strong internal
consistency in the answers to the questions regarding gender quotas. The
average score on the combined measure was 2.99 (standard deviation
[SD] ¼ 1.04).
We created two variables to measure explanations of women’s
underrepresentation as corporate managers.1 The first measure captures the
view that women in the workforce face a structural disadvantage that
prevents them from reaching the highest positions. This measure was
constructed by averaging the scores for five survey items: (1) “Too much of
the recruitment for management positions happens through informal
networks,” (2) “A lot of men have problems working with female















FIGURE 1. Hypothesized model.
1. The questionnaire included 12 survey items asking participants to state how strongly they agreed or
disagreed with reasons for the underrepresentation of women as corporate managers. After conducting
factor and item response analyses, we decided not to use two items: “too few women seek management
positions” and “many women are less likely than men to have career opportunities due to family and
child care responsibilities.” These two questions loaded weakly on both factors, and reliability
analyses showed an increase in the Cronbach’s alpha when these items were dropped from the
combined measures. Thus, both questions had a rather weak correlation with the two measures.
Because we wanted a measure of the distinct view of either “structural inequality” or “women being
less qualified,” we decided not to use these two questions.









































a priority within the business sector,” (4) “Women applicants are ignored
during the recruitment process,” and (5) “The business sector is dominated
by men with insufficient trust in women” (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.72).
The second measure was also constructed by averaging five survey items:
(1) “A lot of women handle the pressure from a leadership position more
poorly than men,” (2) “Women are less likely than men to choose to
pursue a career path with great responsibilities,” (3) “Women are less
likely than men to be willing to fight for their career,” (4) “There are not
enough qualified women to recruit,” and (5) “Women are less interested
in positions with responsibilities than men are.” This measure captures
the view that the explanation for women’s underrepresentation in
management positions can be found at the level of individual women —
that is, that women are less driven or less qualified than men to be
managers (Cronbach’s alpha ¼ 0.74). The answer choices for all 10
items ranged from 1 (completely agree) to 5 (completely disagree).
We also use self-reported gender and age. In our final analyses, there were
315 men and 117 women. The average age was 48.35 years (SD ¼ 8.57),
the youngest person was 20, and the oldest was 69. Participants were asked
about their highest level of education. We constructed two dummy
variables included in the regression analyses: one for participants with an
undergraduate degree and one for participants with a graduate degree.
Participants without any university degree served as a reference group.
About 16% of our sample had no university degree, 30% had an
undergraduate degree, and 54% had a graduate degree (see Table 2).
We also examined the impact of company gender distribution. We
created four dummy variables, one each for individuals working in a
company with majority male board members, majority male managers,
majority male middle managers, and majority male total employees.
Participants were given the options of (1) nearly all women (over 90%),
(2) mostly women (61%–90%), (3) somewhat equal gender division
(40%–60%), (4) mostly men (61$–90%), and (5) nearly all men (more
than 90%). We compared individuals working in companies with nearly
all men and with all other groups. Descriptive statistics for all variables
included in the analyses are shown in Table 2.
FINDINGS
We begin our analyses in Table 3, examining gender differences in the
responses to each survey item regarding gender quotas. A relatively high









































percentage of women agreed that gender quota laws can be beneficial to
the management of public companies (77.1%), but only about 42% of
men agreed with that statement. When asked about gender quotas in
management in private companies, a somewhat lower percentage of
women respondents agreed, and a much lower percentage of men (only
about 20%). About 56% of female participants agreed with the statement
that, in general, gender quotas are an important way to attain gender
equality in any corporation’s management, but only 17% of male
participants agreed with this statement.
Table 3 likewise shows that men were twice as likely as women to agree
with the statement that obligatory gender quotas are not beneficial because
the government should not set rules about who represents the owners of
companies (almost 64% of men versus about 31% women). However, a
high percentage of both women and men agreed that gender quotas
harm profitability. Most men and women agreed that competence is
more important than gender (about 63% of women and almost 84% of
male participants). Very few women (under 5%) believed that there are
not enough qualified women, and about 17% of males agreed with that
statement.
The next step in our analyses was to examine the impact that our
independent variables had on the combined measure of support for
gender quotas (Path A, Figure 1). We begin in Table 4 by not including
the variables for explanations for the underrepresentation of women as
managers, thus solely examining the direct relationships between the
independent variables shown in Figure 1.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min. Max.
Support for gender quotas 2.99 1.04 1 5
Explanation: Women less qualified 2.64 .76 1 5
Explanation: Structural inequality 2.74 .73 1 5
Female .27 .44 0 1
Age 48.35 8.57 20 69
Education
No university degree .16 .37 0 1
Undergraduate degree .30 .30 0 1
Graduate degree .54 .54 0 1
Over 90% board members male .19 .39 0 1
Over 90% managers male .29 .46 0 1
Over 90% middle managers male .19 .19 0 1
Over 90% total male employees .14 .35 0 1









































Table 3. Attitudes toward gender quotas by gender
Agree Neutral Disagree
Laws about a minimum 40% of each gender are a beneficial way to













Management of public companies 77.1 42.1 13.7 21.7 9.2 36.2
Management of the board of public stock companies 75.4 39.2 14.6 22.0 10.0 39.2
Management of private limited companies that have more than 50
employees (annual average)
69.5 23.5 17.6 25.4 13.0 51.1
Executive corporations 61.8 20.1 23.7 25.1 14.5 54.9
The economy as a whole 68.7 22.8 19.1 25.8 12.2 51.4
In general, . . .
Gender quotas are an important way to attain gender equality in any
corporation management
56,1 17,4 22,0 24,2 22,0 58,4
Disagree Neutral Agree
Laws about a minimum 40% of each gender are a NOT a beneficial













The government should not set rules on who represents the owners of
companies
47,0 20,3 22,0 15,9 31,1 63,8
It is harmful for profitability 74,0 53,0 19,1 32,4 6,9 14,6
Competence is more important than gender 10,9 5,3 25,8 10,9 63,3 83,8
There are not enough qualified women 89,4 67,3 6,1 15,4 4,5 17,3
Notes: We combined “completely (dis)agree” and ” (dis)agree.” All percentage differences between men and women shown in table are statistically significant





























































Table 4. Ordinary least squares regression estimates predicting support for gender quotas
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
b b b b b b b b b b
Constant 1.68** 1.78** 1.71** 1.60** 1.62
Female 1.17** .49 1.15** .48 1.08** .46 1.16** .48 1.18** .49
Age .02** .15 .02** .14 .02** .17 .02** .17 .02** .17
Undergraduate degree .07 .03 .07 .03 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.00 2.01 2.00
Graduate degree .14 .06 .12 .06 .03 .01 .07 .03 .03 .02
Over 90% male . . .
–Board members 2.24*
–Managers 2.28** 2.12
–Middle managers 2.20 2.07
–Total employees 2.16 2.05
Adj. R2 F-value .23 35.59** .23 28.45** .22 25.09** .23 25.39** .23 25.44**
N 462 456 418 416 416
Note: b ¼ unstandardized coefficient, b ¼ standardized coefficient.









































































In Model 1 (Table 4), we only include gender, age, and education as
predictors. As expected, independent of their age and education, women
were significantly more likely than men to support gender quotas. On
the measure for gender quotas, which ranges from 1 to 5, women’s
average score is 1.17 times higher than the average score for men (b ¼
1.17**). Age is also significantly related to support for gender quotas,
increasing with increased age. A one standard deviation increase in age
is, on average, associated with a 0.15 standard deviation increase in
support for gender quotas (b ¼ 0.02**, b ¼ 0.15). Education, however,
is not related to attitudes toward gender quotas.2 Although those with an
undergraduate (b ¼ 0.07) and a graduate degree (b ¼ 0.14) indicated
higher average support for gender quotas than those without a college
education, this difference is not statistically significant.
In the following models in Table 4, we added a dummy variable for
individuals working in majority male corporations. We included these
different variables in separate models to prevent us from losing statistical
power; these different dummy variables are also highly correlated and
thus may produce multicollinearity problems.3 The results in Model 2
(Table 4) show that managers that work in a corporation in which more
than 90% of the board members are male were significantly less likely to
support gender quotas than respondents working in corporations with
more gender-equal distribution (b ¼ –0.24*). The same pattern can be
observed in Model 3, showing that managers working in corporations
with majority male members were less likely to support gender quotas
than managers in other types of corporations (b ¼ –0.28**). These
relationships are independent of the managers’ own gender (as well as
age and education). Interestingly, gender composition among middle
managers and among employees overall is not associated with attitudes
toward gender quotas (Models 4 and 5, Table 4).
In Table 5, we focus on Path B (Figure 1), thus examining whether our
intendent variables are related to variations in how managers explain
women’s underrepresentation as managers. In the models in Table 5, we
do not include the variables for majority male middle managers and
majority male total employees because these two variables were not
significantly related to attitudes toward gender quotas. Model 1 reveals
2. We also tried analyzing education in different ways (e.g., comparing those with undergraduate and
graduate degrees), but the differences were never statistically significant.
3. When we included all four dummy variables (for majority male board members, managers, middle
managers, and total employees) in the same model, none of the coefficients for those variables was
statistically significant.




















































b b b b b b b b
Constant 2.04** 1.87** 1.94** 1.97**
Female .70** .40 .72** .41 2.22* 2.12 2.181 2.10
Age .01** .12 .01** .13 .01** .14 .01* .11
Undergraduate degree 2.16 2.09 2.10 2.06 2.16 2.09 2.14 2.08
Graduate degree 2.10 2.07 2.01 2.01 2.09 2.05 2.06 2.03
Over 90% male . . .
–Board members .07 .03 .25* .11
–Managers .20* .12 .28** .09
Adj. R2 F-value .14 15.81** .15 15.69** .05 5.77** .06 5.93**
N 454 417 454 417
Note: b ¼ unstandardized coefficient, b ¼ standardized coefficient.









































































that women were more likely to believe that the underrepresentation of
women as managers is caused by structural disadvantages women face.
On a scale of 1 to 5, the women’s score is on average 0.70 higher than
the male score in our sample (b ¼ 0.70**). Older managers were also
more likely than younger managers to believe that women face
discrimination, although the relationship between age and this view is
rather weak (b ¼ 0.01**, b ¼ 0.12).
As observed in Model 3, education does not have a significant
relationship with explanations for women’s underrepresentation as
managers. Likewise, the difference in explanations between those
working in corporations with majority male board members and those
working in other types of corporations is not statistically significant. In
Model 2 (Table 4), we included the dummy variable for individuals
working in corporations with majority male managers. This variable is
significantly related to the view that women face some sort of
discrimination within the labor market and are thus underrepresented as
managers (b ¼ 0.20*).
In Models 3 and 4 (Table 5), we examine differences in the view that the
underrepresentation of women as managers is attributable to women
themselves (i.e., that they are less driven or less qualified than men).
Perhaps not surprisingly, women were somewhat less likely than men to
hold this view. However, the gender-based difference concerning the
view that women themselves are at fault is smaller than the gender-based
difference concerning the view that women face discrimination
(comparing the coefficients for gender in Models 1 and 2 to the
coefficients for gender in Models 3 and 4, in which gender is barely
significant). Age has a weak but statistically significant relationship with
the belief that women are themselves at fault for their
underrepresentation. Thus, even though older people were somewhat
more likely to believe that women face discrimination in the workforce,
the belief that women are less driven or less qualified than men also
increased with age (e.g., in Model 3, b ¼ 0.01**), but again, the
relationship is weak. Similarly, managers working in corporations with
majority male managers were significantly more likely than others to
seek explanations for women’s underrepresentation as managers in the
women themselves (b ¼ 0.28** in Model 4, Table 5).
Finally, in Table 6, we examine the relationship between support for gender
quotas and individuals’ explanations for women’s underrepresentation
as managers while controlling for all other variables (thus focusing on
Path C in Figure 1). In line with our hypotheses, the view that women









































are in a disadvantaged position in the job market, and therefore
underrepresented as managers, is associated with increased support for
gender quotas (b ¼ 0.39** in Model 1 and b ¼ 0.43** in Model 2,
Table 6). Likewise, the view that women’s underrepresentation as
managers is self-inflicted is associated with less support for gender quotas
(b ¼ –0.25** in Model 1, and b ¼ –0.24** in Model 2). It is also
important to note that the impact of gender on support for gender quotas
decreased substantially (e.g., from b ¼ 1.15** in Model 2, Table 4, to
b ¼ 0.81** in Model 1, Table 6). The coefficients for age and working
in a male-dominated corporation did not change, and the coefficient for
working with majority male board members decreased only slightly.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we asked whether certain groups of business leaders are more
likely than others to support gender quotas and whether business leaders
tend to explain the underrepresentation of women as managers with
structural or individual explanations. In this way, we developed
theoretical and practical knowledge concerning the gender disparity in
business leadership positions, with significant relevance to policies and
Table 6. Ordinary least squares regression estimates predicting support for
gender quotas
Model 1 Model 2
b b b b
Constant 1.47** 1.37**
Female .81** .34 .73** .31
Age .02** .13 .02** .15
Undergraduate degree .09 .04 .02 .11
Graduate degree .15 .07 .03 .01
Over 90% male . . .
–Board members 2.191 2.07
–Managers 2.29** 2.12
Explanation for women’s underrepresentation . . .
–Structural disadvantage .39** .29 .43** .32
–Women themselves 2.25** 2.20 2.24** 2.19
Adj. R2 F-value .33 32.31** .33 30.27**
N 450 414
Note: b ¼ unstandardized coefficient, b ¼ standardized coefficient.
1 p , .1; * p , .05; ** p , .01.









































active measures. If the aim is to improve the gender balance in
corporations, structural explanations require different approaches than
individual explanations. Bacchi’s (1999, 2009) WPR method of policy
analysis proposes that problem representations both reflect and affect
political interventions and their political mobilization. If the dominant
framing of the problem is skewed in line with the interests of
corporations and their owners, the responsibility will lie with the
individual women or with women as a group. Accordingly, political
interventions might be in the form of women-friendly, supportive
measures, or there may be no interventions. If, on the other hand, the
problem is portrayed as a structural issue relating to institutional
practices, then measures tend to focus on the larger organizational
structure, norms, and practices of the corporations.
In addition to shedding light on the prevalence of structural and
individual explanations in this respect, we also attempted to further the
knowledge of factors that explain differences among managers in terms
of support for gender quotas in management positions. We hypothesized
that women, older professionals, and those with higher education (a
college degree) would be more prone to support gender quotas, in line
with previous research showing more support for gender equality in
these groups (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Seierstad 2016). Our main
argument is that these groups might have a better sense of the structural
disadvantages faced by women in the labor market, which prevents them
from reaching the highest positions. In line with Acker’s (1990, 2006,
2012) theories on gender organizations and inequality regimes, we also
suggested that individuals working in majority male corporations would
be less likely to support gender quotas. It may be assumed that majority
male corporations tend to have a masculine culture that impacts the
views on gender quotas among its employees. Our findings partly
support these hypotheses.
We found that women are in every situation considerably more likely
than men to think that gender quota laws for top positions in the
workforce are a beneficial way to attain gender equality. Both men and
women are more likely to support gender quotas in public rather than in
private companies. This resonates with extant research (Diðriksdóttir
2017; Teigen 2011, 2015). Although few managers (both male and
female) believe that gender quotas harm profitability and that there are
not enough qualified women, a somewhat higher percentage of
participants (particularly male participants) do not think that the
government should set rules about who represents the owners of









































companies. The reason could be the view that the causes of the gender
disparity lie outside the company or the labor market itself. Our findings
indicate that how people explain the underrepresentation of women as
managers is strongly related to their support for gender quotas. In other
words, people who believe that women are structurally disadvantaged
in the labor market are more likely to support gender quotas than those
who do not. Conversely, the more people believe that individual factors
explain the lack of gender diversity in business leadership, the less
likely they are to support gender quotas. Importantly, a substantial part
of the gender-based differences in support for gender quotas is due to
the fact that men and women explain the underrepresentation of
women in managerial roles differently. Women are more likely to
believe that women are disadvantaged in the labor market, and they
are less likely to appeal to individual explanations to explain women’s
underrepresentation in management roles. Thus, our findings contradict
Hakim’s (2004, 2011) assertions that labor market relations reflect
women’s free choice and preferences.
Our results also show that older individuals are more likely to support
gender quotas than younger individuals, and this difference is
independent of how people explain the underrepresentation of women
as managers. This is consistent with the findings of Inglehart and Norris
(2003), who discovered that although younger generations tend to have
more egalitarian views on gender equality than older ones, that trend has
reached a “plateau.” This resonates with the findings of Seierstad (2016,
397), who discovered complex age patterns, with some young women as
“reluctant supporters” of gender quotas.
In line with Inglehart and Norris (2003), but contrary to Barnes and
Córdova (2016), we hypothesized that managers with a university degree
would be more likely to support gender quotas than those without a
university degree. However, our findings indicate that education has no
impact on attitudes toward gender quotas. This result could be attributed
to the fact that our sample lacks variation; about 84% of our managers
have at least a bachelor’s degree.
We also hypothesized that individuals working in majority male
corporations would be less likely to support gender quotas than those
working in corporations with gender-equal distribution. In line with
Acker’s gender organizations (1990, 2006), and Dämmrich and Blossfeld
(2017), who found that women’s chances of gaining supervisory
positions varied depending on company gender composition, we
suggested that individuals in more male-oriented work environments









































might be more prone to resist gender quotas. Our results indicate that the
gender division among employees overall and among middle managers
did not have any impact on individuals’ support for gender quotas.
However, working in a corporation with a majority male board members
or majority male managers is associated with less support for gender
quotas. This relationship does not seem to be affected by differences in
how people explain women’s underrepresentation in managerial roles. For
example, even though those working in corporations that have almost
exclusively male managers are more likely to believe that women are less
qualified and less driven than men — causing women to have fewer
management positions than men at such companies — they are also more
likely than others to believe that women are structurally disadvantaged
(thus, these two views are not mutually exclusive). Furthermore,
independent of explanations for the underrepresentation of women as
managers, those working in these majority male manager corporations are
still less likely to support gender quotas. Thus, unlike the differences in
support for gender quotas between men and women — which can be
explained, at least in part, by differences in beliefs about causes of the
underrepresentation of women as managers — those working in
corporations with majority male managers are less likely to support gender
quotas for other reasons.
The strength of this research is its strong data set, based on a survey
including all managers belonging to the executive committees of the
250 largest companies in Iceland and not only a survey sample. The
response rate is high. However, a weakness of our study is that we cannot
connect companies to respondents, which means that we do not know
how comparable companies are across different levels of gender equality
and across differing attitudes toward gender quotas. Nevertheless, we see
the data as valuable to the theoretical and practical debate about the
causes for lack of gender diversity in business leadership.
CONCLUSIONS
This research adds to the knowledge on corporate board quotas with
implications both for potential legislative and policy measures as well as
for corporate life. Business leaders are in a key position to influence the
gender imbalance in top leadership positions, given the limits provided
by the legal and regulatory framework. This research provides nuanced
indications that support for gender quotas is strongly related to how









































business leaders explain the underrepresentation of women as managers.
Male business leaders are more likely than females to see individual
reasons behind the lack of gender diversity in business leadership (i.e., to
believe that the reason for the gender disparity lies with the women
themselves rather than in the surrounding structures). This is particularly
prevalent among the youngest age group. The individualist approach and
the structural approach require different policy measures to change the
gender composition of corporations. The individualist approach implies
that women are either less qualified or less driven than men to be
managers. This would call for individualized interventions. The
structural approach implies that competent women may be blocked from
leadership positions, such as by the structure of the work or the labor
market inhibiting a woman’s advancement (by penalizing career
interruptions, etc.). This view implies that there is an efficiency case for
using quotas. Quotas may also have a positive effect on potential women
leaders themselves, resulting in a more efficient selection of leaders, and
mandated female leaders may serve as role models for other aspiring
women (Pande and Ford 2011). The research also reveals that male
dominance at higher company levels — that is, on boards and among
managers — is related to negative views on gender quotas, whereas the
gender composition among middle managers and employees in general
is unrelated to views on gender quotas. This emphasizes the impact of
business leaders on the recruitment of women to top positions in
companies and the importance of improved gender balance in top
leadership roles.
The policy implications of our findings have direct relevance for the
Icelandic conditions, but they may also be valuable in a wider context, as
not all countries have implemented laws to boost gender diversity in the
boardroom. The corporate quota reform is clearly a measure responding
to a problem at the structural level rather than the individual level,
according to Bacchi (2006). Since most companies obey the law, the
reform has become successful, but only within the framework of the
quota laws. That is, no spin-off effect to other areas in corporate
operations are identified. This, in addition to some other recent reforms
in Iceland, reflects an inclination of the Icelandic legislative assembly to
frame problems as structural and institutional practices rather than the
problems of individual women. Hence, for example, the radical parental
leave reform from 2000, which includes a nontransferable, take-it-or-
leave-it paternity leave, and the Icelandic legislation on the Equal Pay
Standard enforced in 2018, which requires employers to comply to an









































equal pay system. Both serve as examples of a law-based, structural rather
than individual problem representation. The fact that gender diversity in
business leadership has increased almost only in connection to the quota
laws, may be related to the fact that the most powerful individuals in the
companies, male CEOs, are skeptical toward implications such as
corporate quotas. The inclination of the Icelandic authorities to
introduce legislation, however, counteracts the negative effects of the
opposition and the corporate quotas are not at risk. For countries
considering increasing the number of women in business, the Icelandic
experience regarding the legal framework and the views and agency of
key players may feed into a better informed decision-making.
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Dämmrich, Johanna, and Hans-Peter Blossfeld. 2017. “Women’s Disadvantage in Holding
Supervisory Positions: Variations among European Countries and the Role of
Horizontal Gender Segregation.” Acta Sociologica 60 (3): 262–82.
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